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Introduction 
 
Structural change is a disruptive process. Whether you are in the steel industry in 
the 1970's or production agriculture in the 1990's the effects are extremely 
unsettling (Rose and Thomas, 2000; CP, 2000). Producers are being forced to either 
exit the industry or adopt new business models, but to accomplish this they are 
faced with the difficult task of strategically repositioning themselves. Just in the 
state of Illinois, for example, there were 40 value added processing business plans 
in development during 20001 (Saputo, 2000). These long jump ventures into 
processing are risky though and raise important fundamental questions about how 
producers select appropriate strategies, and is the subject of this manuscript.  
 
While there has been research and analysis as to the success factors of new 
cooperatives (Waner, 2000; Bruynis et al, 2001; Torgerson, 2001; Carlberg et al, 
2004), little empirical research has been conducted as to their success and failure 
rates. Waner (2000) and Torgerson (2001) believe the failure rate to be less than the 
failure rate of the average startup. Sporleder and Bailey (2001) in their model of 
new generation equity investment assume a moderate failure rate range of 33% and 
50%. The research is clear as to success factors, focusing on the tactical features of 
the business, i.e., adequate capital, hiring skilled management, and having an 
engaged board of directors. Left unaddressed in the analysis are the strategic forces 
that determine success or failure.  With this in mind this manuscript analyses the 
cooperative formation question from a strategic management perspective. 
 
Table 1: Number of Swine Herds in Selected States and the United States (1989 - 
1999) 




Illinois  16,600  15,300  14,800 13,500 11,500 11,000 9,600  8,800  7,500  7,000  6,500  6.08% 
Indiana  15,000  13,000  12,000 12,800 12,300 11,200 9,600  8,500  6,500  6,400  6,200  5.87% 
Iowa  37,000  35,000  34,000 35,000 33,000 29,000 25,000 21,000 18,000 17,500 14,500 6.08% 
Missouri  16,000  16,000  15,000 13,000 11,000 10,500 8,500  7,000  5,500  5,000  4,000  7.50% 
4-State 
Region  84,600  79,300  75,800 74,300 67,800 61,700 52,700 45,300 37,500 35,900 31,200 6.31% 
United 
States  300,910  268,140  247,090 240,150 218,060 207,980 182,700 157,450 122,160 114,380 98,460  6.73% 
Source: NASSa, 2000; NASSb, 2000; NASSc,2000 
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Figure 1: US Hog (All) Price 1989 - 1999 
Source: NASSd, 2000 
 
 
Specifically, this manuscript addresses three aspects of the strategy process. The 
first analyzes the strategic implications of brick and mortar investments (long 
jumps). These are of great interest to agricultural producers looking to vertically 
integrate into food or fuel processing. Second, given this issue of producer vertical 
integration, the paper conveys how firms develop sound strategy. Finally, a case 
study of the Atkins Ranch brand, developed and owned by a farmer-owned 
integrated lamb cooperative from New Zealand, provides an empirical context to 
better understand the complexities and challenges of long jumping. 
 
The effects of structural change in North America are especially acute for grain 
farmers and hog producers. The rate of exodus of independent farmers is startling 
throughout the prairies of Canada and the Midwest U.S. The Canadian press stated 
that 6,000 farmers were forced out of business in 2000 (CP, 2000) and the industry 
was suffering a 7% annualized attrition rate (Statistics Canada, 2000). In the 
United States, the number of hog operations fell at a similar rate, 6.7%, since 1989 
(Table 1).  Other than a brief respite in 1997, hog prices have fallen over the last 10 
years (Figure 1). This is due, in part, to the rapid increase in production capacity by 
integrated swine systems. Consequently, returns to outdated organizational forms 
decline and capital leaves searching out superior opportunities. For example, 
capital continues to flow to integrated systems, such as Smithfield Foods whose 
market capitalization has risen almost $1,000,000,000 or 148% since 1996 
(Morningstar, 2000).  
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One of the most common strategic choices for producer groups are producer-built 
processing plants, e.g. hog slaughter and ethanol. Producers pursing vertical 
integration often give three rationales: 
 
1)  The first is to take control of their own crop (Smith, 1998; Producers Alliance, 
1999). Harold Tilstra, a farmer from Luverne, Minnesota is senior vice chair of 
Cornerstone Cooperative and chair and chief executive officer of Agri-Energy 
LLC., a producer-owned ethanol company in southern Minnesota. In an 
interview he commented that 
 
...such a concept (producer-owned value added production) is critical to 
farmers seeking to survive in the future. Agriculture margins are 
increasingly narrow ... and...retaining commodity ownership until 
additional value has been built into their crops means more returns for 
producers as well as economic growth for their communities.(Tilstra in 
Smith, 1998) 
 
However, does this strategy really mean “more returns for producers”? 
 
2)  A second rationale, is that integration allows producers to capture the higher 
returns and lower price volatility downstream (Forester, 1996; Siebert et al, 
1997; Smith, 1998; Smith, 2000; Ball, 2000). Gary Ball, salesman for Ursa 
Farmer Co-op in Illinois commented: 
 
As a rule, selling pork makes money and when it doesn’t, it loses a 
whole lot less than selling hogs. It is clear the independent pork 
producer needs to capture a larger portion of the farm to market share. 
Owning and operating your own packing plant is the most profitable 
and efficient way to secure a larger slice of the farm to market share. 
(Ball, 2000: p. 10) 
 
Producers are correct recognizing that an ever-increasing proportion of a food 
product’s final value is produced and captured by enterprises beyond the farm 
gate (Fabi, 2000). A fundamental question and a question of strategy remains; 
how best can producers capture a greater proportion of the value in the down 
stream supply chain? 
 
3)  Finally, a very practical rationale for integrating downstream is to replace lost 
markets due to industry consolidation (Illinois Farm Bureau, 1999; Ball, 2000). 
This has been especially acute for an Illinois group, who has recently formed 
American Premium Foods. American is a recently established Illinois new 
generation cooperative (NGC) whose objective was to build a producer-owned 
hog slaughter plant. This group, like many NGCs, funds itself through producer 
equity, government grants, and debt capital. In the case of American, 30% was P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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producer equity, 11% contributed by the state, 14% through capital leasing, and 
45% bank financed (Smith, 2000).  The company was structured as a new 
generation cooperative with the average member investing $23,400 (Smith, 
2000).  When asked why they thought the construction of a new packing plant 
was a good idea, members felt they had to do something because their traditional 
marketing channels and outlets had disappeared (Baumgartner, 1999; American 
Heritage Farms, Inc., 1999; American Family Farms Co-op, 1999; Baumgartner, 
2000;). 
 
This logic is consistent with Sexton and Iskow (1993) that look at cooperatives as 
solutions to a market failure. Sexton and Iskow (1993) were unable to empirically 
prove that marketing cooperatives (vertical integration into marketing and or 
processing) improved economic efficiency or reduced market failures. Theoretically 
though they argued, consistent with the remarks above; that the role of the vertical 
move was in fact to eliminate the market failure by disintermediating source of the 
market abuse. 
 
The logic expressed above by the producers as to their reasons for vertically 
integrate differ though significantly with others’ who looked at incentives within 
the context of an industrializing agriculture. Boehlje and Schrader (1996 and 1998) 
analyzed structural changes in the agri-food complex and identified greater 
coordination and integration as essential features of the modern landscape. The 
greater coordination from their perspective has two key elements, the first intends 
to deliver greater value to end user markets by better meeting their needs and the 
second is that the means to those ends is through enhanced knowledge and 
information exchange.  While the activity of producers integrating is consistent with 
the increased vertical alignment occurring in the modern agri-food system, the 
producer rationale for integrating, differs in an important way from this logic. The 
producers look to vertical integration/coordination to retain greater value for 
themselves as a response to poor market conditions. Boehlje and Schrader don’t look 
at vertical integration and coordination to help suppliers attain greater market 
power, but look to these new structures as mechanisms designed “to 
accommodate…end-user…demands” (Boehlje and Schrader, 1996, p. 335).  Using 
this logic, producer vertical ventures may be operating in a value-vacuum because 
they are formed un-anchored by end-user demand. This lack of a connection to 




Strategic Management Theory of Core Competencies and Tacit Knowledge   
For producers, the forces of structural change are strong and the need for strategies 
to participate in downstream markets is critical. Strategic positioning is an 
adaptive strategy for value creation in response to acute changes in a firm’s 
competitive environment (Rumelt, 1982; Porter, 1980; Itami, 1987; Quinn et al, P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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1990: Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; D’Aveni and Ilinitch, 1992; Prahalad; 1993; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg et al, 1998).  Two of the most compelling concepts from 
the strategic positioning literature are core competency (Quinn et al, 1990: 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and tacit knowledge (Itami, 1987; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi in Mintzberg et al, 1998) These concepts have been very useful explaining 
why in dynamic environments some firms succeed while others languish.  
 
First, successful adaptors (in our case producers wishing to vertically integrate) 
understand their capabilities as bundles of competencies, not products or functions 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996; Barney, 2002). This is 
especially critical in dynamic industries or periods of structural change where 
products become outdated and adaptation is required.  Competencies are the human 
capital in the firms, the shared knowledge, the corporate history, communication 
networks and traditions, organizational structure, and collective learning 
(Prahalad, 1993). It is all that remains if you were to remove the products. Itami 
(1987) identifies core competencies as invisible assets, and even though they are 
difficult to measure, they are the essence of a firm’s value. “Invisible assets are the 
real source of competitive power and the key factor in corporate adaptability for 
three reasons: they are hard to accumulate, they are capable of simultaneous 
multiple uses, and they are both inputs and outputs of business activities (Itami, 
1987: p14).” When applied to producer ventures; if all producers are attempting to 
do is vertically integrate through physical asset accumulation, they can be at best 
no better than anyone else in the market with the same bundle of physical assets. 
This is the essential strategic notion of real competitive advantage and uniqueness 
of resources within the industry (Porter, 1980; Barney, 2002). 
 
Key components of core competency are information and knowledge. Managing the 
flow of information and productivity of these knowledge assets is complex yet 
critical for strategic repositioning. A firm that has little experience in an industry 
has little access to critical information flows or experiences to build the intangible 
assets necessary for competitive success (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). External 
information flows originate in the firm and flow to clients and suppliers. Internal 
flows pass to the firm from clients and suppliers and intra-firm flows occur across 
functions and divisions within the firm (Itami, 1987). These information flows and 
management are critical to the learning organization (Mintzberg, 1987; Senge, 
1990) and the buildup of, and production from, the stock of invisible assets and the 
firm’s core competencies. Without these experiences the firm cannot create the 
intangible asset base necessary for competitive success. Firms can purchase hard 
assets, but as they are not inimitable they do not generate value by themselves but 
rely on the intangible assets as the source of value (Itami,1987).  
 
The intangible nature of core competencies poses risks to good strategic thinking. 
When core competencies are tacit, idiosyncratic, and the dominant logic; firms may 
be myopic about their real value contribution (Barney, 2002). As firms seek to P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  47
diversify to exploit these competencies, key is understanding whether the value 
dimension of the competency is trivial or significant. At a more practical level is the 
value explicitly able to favorably impact costs and revenues.  
 
This understanding of the significance of the core competencies is consistent with 
the Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) discussion of tacit knowledge and effective 
decision making. Knowledge is explicit when it is articulated and codified in 
writing, verbalized or coded in drawings, computer programs or other products. 
Tacit knowledge however is uncoded and non-verbalized. It reflects the difference 
between what we know and what we can tell (Polyani, 1966). Thus tacit knowledge 
may not even be able to be verbalized or articulated. It can be acquired largely 
through personal experience and is often embedded in the routines of organizations 
or individuals and therefore difficult to copy and convey. Much of the knowledge 
needed for successful decision making in a complex world is not explicit. It is made 
up of unique experiences generated over time and through interactions that cannot 
be replicated by formal rules (Mintzberg, 1987).  
  
Managers... need to get out of the old mode of thinking that knowledge can be 
acquired, taught, and trained through manuals, books, or lectures. Instead, they 
need to pay more attention to the less formal and systematic side of knowledge and 
start focusing on highly subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches that are gained 
through the use of metaphors, pictures, and experiences ( Nonaka and Takeuchi, in 
Mintzberg, 1998) 
 
Decisions are made on instinct and common sense, and then they become explicit 
and finally are judged within the organizational context. Once judged either 
favorably or unfavorably, they are interpreted and become again part of the tacit 
knowledge base.  This occurs in a spiraling process from tacit to explicit and back 
again through an important confirmation step (Nonaka and Takeuchi, in Mintzberg, 
1998) 
 
Strategy emerges from this incremental process of building experiences and 
expertise that are brought to bear on the next set of challenges (Quinn, 1977; 
Mintzberg, 1987). To be successful tacit knowledge is required as it is fundamental 
to value creation and competitiveness. A firm wishing vertically integate, say from 
production to processing, must access the tacit knowledge that produces value in 
addition to gaining access to physical assets.  But by definition a firm undertaking a 
long jump venture possesses little tacit knowledge overlap with its new endeavor, 
creating a structurally inconsistent situation. This is the essence of the challenges 
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Figure 2: Strategic Repositioning 
 
 
The Opportunity Gap 
 
Understanding one’s own core competencies and access to, or the possession of, tacit 
knowledge are fundamental to strategic repositioning. Prahalad writings capture 
the significance of these concepts in his model of the productivity and opportunity 
gap (Figure 2).  A firm has two basic strategic positions, a focus on productivity or a 
focus on opportunity. Each strategy has its place. 
 
A productivity gap orientation focuses on present routines, processes, products, and 
markets (Prahalad, 1993). Decisions in such firms involve improving productivity of 
known systems and routines. This strategy is important for success when markets 
are static, mature, or fully competitive. In such settings core competency and tacit 
knowledge advantages are more stable. If preferences remain unchanged or 
markets are mature, firms are able to invest in assets corresponding to long 
production runs and lowering marginal costs (Ng and Goldsmith, 1998). This is the 
case in fully competitive markets where price is exogenous and improving 
production efficiency and minimizing costs drive profitability.  P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  49
 
Historically, commercial agriculture could focus on the productivity gap.  The fields 
of farm management and agricultural economics, based on the neoclassical 
traditions of Walras (1954 in Varian, 1984) and others, have historically focused on 
optimizing the input mix and minimizing costs. Example methodologies are the 
production function approach, linear programming, and measuring productive 
efficiency. These have been appropriate methodologies because agricultural markets 
historically have been competitive, dominated by commodities, employed broad and 
relatively static standards and grades, and involved market prices exogenous to the 
farm’s problem. 
 
The difficulty arises when markets become dynamic and firms enter a period of 
structural change. Or in the case of US agriculture under globalization markets 
become more rivalrous. Product or production-based strategies are lost because the 
markets with which are they are associated have now become temporal and difficult 
to define. This is due to end-user needs becoming temporal and global competitors 
emerging attempting to serve those needs (Goldsmith and Bender, 2004). 
Traditional competencies become less effective and tacit knowledge of new markets 
is insufficient. The comfortable fit between production process, product, and market 
is altered. In terms of strategic positioning, continued focus on the productivity gap 
is relatively simpler because it attempts to make known processes better, serve 
known markets more effectively, and produce known products more efficiently. 
However, globalization and the structural change that results have seriously 
challenged the traditional US business model of being the world’s low cost producer 
of commodities. Technology is packaged in ever more useable formats adaptable by 
almost any producer in the world (Goldsmith and Ramos, 2002). Falling farmer 
incomes in North America reflect decreasing commodity prices outpacing producers’ 
abilities to increase productivity. The productivity gap strategy can be a failed 
strategy as costs become harder to reduce, foreign producers are willing to accept 
lower prices, and commodity’s share of total food value declines. This requires that 
some U.S. producers may need to shift away from the productivity gap and focus on 
the other half of the value creation equation, defined by Prahalad (1993) as the 
opportunity gap.  This though creates a real challenge because as producers 
strategically reposition they need to access and leverage the competencies and 
knowledge necessary to compete in new markets. 
 
To accomplish such a strategic repositioning, a firm assesses itself not on its current 
or historical production plan, the products that it produces, but on its core 
competencies. During times of increasing turbulence and instability, firms need to 
refocus on investment in, and leveraging of, knowledge assets that are inimitable 
and provide them a competitive advantage in markets where direct competition 
between firms (rivalry) is the norm. The concept of core competency shifts the 
strategy process away from the obvious to the yet unexploited. This would apply to 
long jump strategic repositioning by farmers looking to create more value through  P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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Figure 3: Regions of Strategic Repositioning 
*During periods of market turbulence 
 
 
vertical integration. For producers they would be shifting their focus from the 
production side of the business to the marketing side. The marketing knowledge 
gained then feeds back into changes and adaptations to the production plan and 
asset mix of the vertically integrated endeavor. Joining a firm’s understanding of its 
core competencies with a demand or market perspective allows firms to create value 
by more directly addressing and incorporating customer needs and opportunities.  
New opportunities in agriculture arise from the uniqueness of the farm as a 




Strategic repositioning during periods of market turbulence involves a four-part 
process (Figure 3), Prahalad (1993) calls this the strategic architecture.  
 
1)  The first aspect is to recognize a firm’s core competencies. What are the firm’s 
inimitable resources? In the case of a group of agricultural producers, what 
intangible assets does it bring to the supply chain?  
 
2)  Second, is for the firm to move beyond the productivity gap and a cost focus, and 
give attention to the opportunity gap and a value focus. Rackam and Devincentis 
(1999) call this value chain mapping; a creative process looking for new 
opportunities involving suppliers and customers.  Part of this process involves 
understanding broad trends and indicators about an industry. More importantly P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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this involves the supplier (producer group) understanding customers’ needs, 
challenges, opportunities, and competitive landscape2. Farmers as they look to 
jumping beyond commodity production will be hard pressed to create value 
without an understanding what clients value.  
 
3)  The third aspect leverages resources. Firms need to access resources outside 
their own firm to acquire the necessary tacit knowledge and avoid the 
managerial burdens of vertical integration. Vertical integration involves 
conducting business in new stages of the marketing channel. This offers 
opportunities for higher returns and reduced volatility but also encompasses 
significant additional managerial responsibilities, new competencies, and 
unknown tacit knowledge.  
 
4)  Finally, the firm needs to evaluate the appropriate governance structure to 
leverage the necessary knowledge and managerial expertise and balance that 
with ownership and control. In the Atkins Ranch case that follows producers 
knew what they didn’t know. Then they made sure they acquired the necessary 






















Figure 4: Value Triad 
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innovation, the more a 
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Figure 5: Innovation Adoption under Familiarity Constraints 
Source: Adapted from Afuah (1998) 
 
 
Value Creation Triad 
 
The Value Creation Triad relates the three factors of knowledge, managerial 
burden, and ownership control to each other as well as with the choice of 
governance structure and the opportunity to capture the value (Figure 4). By itself 
governance does not create value but it can be conducive to creating value. The 
triad models a tradeoff problem between the need for knowledge that can be sourced 
either internally or externally, the management burden, and the ability to capture 
rents.  
 
There are numerous governance options open for producers to participate in the 
supply chain (Adams and Goldsmith, 1999). On one end of the governance 
continuum resides the spot market strategy option where producers operate 
decoupled selling commodities. At the other extreme resides the long jump option of 
full integration where the producers own both sides of the transaction. Interestingly 
neither extreme strategy on its own contributes the necessary tacit knowledge. In 
the spot market case, producers’ value in the supply chain is captured in the 
commodities they sell.  The marketing stages are decoupled between production and 
processing. External knowledge may be high but exists with other firms in the 
marketing channel. None of that tacit knowledge and very little of the explicit 
knowledge flows back to producers.  
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With vertical integration, producers would own both sides of the transaction. The 
ability to capture rents from the new supply chain arrangement is highest because 
of complete ownership. Correspondingly though, the managerial burden is high. 
What limits the value creation in this scenario is the inability to source knowledge 
because producers’ internal knowledge base is rooted in production and vertical 
integration constrains information partnering because by definition the same firm 
owns both sequential stages of production. Producers, realizing the inconsistency 
between available knowledge and management responsibility might try to access 
knowledge outside the firm (Figure 5). But as stated above, tacit knowledge is the 
source of value and innovation rents, contributors of knowledge will require a 
premium for the knowledge and innovation they are contributing to the value 
proposition. Therefore producer vertical moves by necessity will require significant 
relationships in order to acquire the necessary knowledge resources. These 
relationships will need to be viewed to be mutually beneficial and will likely involve 
producers exchanging ownership and/or control of the business to acquire the 
necessary knowledge. In the Atkins case below the producers paid for the 
knowledge outright instead of offering an equity stake. The Value Triad captures 
this tension in the long jump venture where tacit knowledge is at a premium and 
the entity that owns it deserves to capture the value. This reality can doom a 
vertical venture to be under capitalized in terms of tacit knowledge. More 
reasonable, and possibly why they are more common, is quasi-integration, such as 
contracting and joint ventures. Under these governance structures producer 
managerial burdens and rent appropriations are appropriately reduced better 
balancing the knowledge requirements, managerial burden, and rent capture.  
 
We have argued that long jump producer-owned ventures are a difficult means at 
strategic repositioning. Structural change and economic duress for producers are 
real though and producers are looking for alternatives to the commodity model. The 
following case study highlights a New Zealand firm that was able to long jump, 





Following the wide-ranging economic reforms in the mid 1980's of the New Zealand 
economy, including the agricultural sector, a small group of Wairarapa3 sheep 
farmers recognized that they needed to identify and develop an alternative 
marketing channel for their core product, lamb, as the traditional channels where 
not providing sufficient economic returns.  
 
After some initial research in 1988, the group recognized that there was a market 
opportunity in the Bay Area of California providing a high quality chilled lamb 
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product to the hotel and restaurant trade as well as the supermarkets that were 
servicing either ethnic communities of traditional lamb consumers or high 
disposable income consumers. They faced two basic questions 1) how to develop the 
market in the Bay Area, and 2) how to establish a supply chain flexible enough to 
ensure a sufficient supply of the specified premium product.  
 
A closed membership cooperative of 106 producers was established to provide the 
initial financing for the development and establishment of these marketing 
opportunities. The cooperative members each had to provide an establishment 
investment of approximately NZD 10,000. This was later increased through two 
additional funding drives to approximately NZD 40,000. For this equity investment 
members received the first right of supply for the new marketing channel. The 
cooperative developed a flexible market driven supply chain starting with 
information collection and knowledge acquisition from the customer and client in 
marketplace which then flowed back directly to the individual chain participants 
including producers. This allowed chain members to adjust their operations to 
deliver the combination of product and service attributes that maximized their 
residual claims. The cooperative initially made minimal investments in hard 
physical assets; effectively all of the financing was used for market development 
and supply chain relationship development. Bank financing was engaged only after 
markets were established and product was being produced. This financing was used 
to support the organizations working capital requirements with inventory providing 
collateral. 
 
Atkins Ranch’s shows their shift to an opportunity gap focus by beginning their 
strategic repositioning downstream in the areas of distribution and marketing. 
Consistent with Boehlje and Schrader (1996 and 1998) this exemplifies a proper 
demand-pull strategy as opposed one of supply-push. Consistent with Barney 
(1992), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), and Porter (1980), Atkins is challenged how to 
obtain the critical resources necessary to compete in the marketplace. In Atkins’ 
case the strategic resource is marketing knowledge and cold chain management, 
which are tacit, and not related to their core competency as a producers’ 
cooperative. Quinn and Mintzberg’s theory would constrain the problem for Atkins, 
arguing that a new strategic architecture should emerge incrementally.  That a long 
jump transformation into meat processing and distribution would be ill-advised. 
Then how should Atkins proceed? They need to change their strategic architecture 
somehow. Remaining a traditional producer cooperative in the New Zealand 
business environment with an oversupply of lamb makes staying the course 
untenable. Here’s how they did it. 
 
First, to assist with the US market development they hired an expatriate 
international food-marketing consultant based in Berkeley, California. This 
individual possessed numerous years of international food industry experience as a 
past executive of a Californian-based international supermarket company. The P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  55
consultant provided the cooperative with substantial explicit and tacit knowledge 
assisting the cooperative in understanding the dynamics and nuances of the 
market. How supermarkets within the region purchased meat products and how 
and who managed the in-store product marketing and promotion. The tacit 
knowledge was critical to the success of the venture as not only was meat 
distribution vastly different from animal production, but the Californian market 
differed substantially from the New Zealand market. Second, one of the 
cooperatives farmer directors relocated to the Bay Area and set up a new business 
unit. In this way the cooperative could more efficiently import the necessary new 
knowledge. They would now understand the market better and establish a US 
office, but they could be located closer to their consultant, strategic partners, and 
customers. Working closely for over a year and creating the marketing unit 
facilitated the tacit knowledge transfer to, and learning process by, the cooperative.  
 
Gaining access into the supermarket required not only the regional purchasing 
managers consent, but it also meant developing individual relationships with the 
meat department managers in each individual store to obtain preferential meat 
counter space. This type of relationship development was also imperative in the 
hotel and restaurant industry, where head chefs make all purchasing decisions. As 
a consequence, relationship development and management became a strategic 
initiative of the organization. The relationships were mutually beneficial for both 
parties. The cooperative received superior market information allowing them to 
better meet their clients’ requirements and product was customized daily to the 
individual stores’ requirements. This reduced the meat managers’ labor costs and 
in-store promotional activities were developed. In return the cooperative usually 
received preferential meat counter positioning and better market information, both 
of which translated into increased sales. 
 
Active relationship management has been critical to their operations success. 
Effective relationship management allows for direct client feedback which can be 
quickly transformed into value either by slightly altering product mix for the next 
delivery to better match their client’s needs or if substantial market changes are 
observed, important information flows upchain to operations in New Zealand. The 
local processor-partner could then alter the product mix or processing schedule and 
producers would adjust their animal specifications or production practices. Given 
the 12-week delay between initial slaughter and delivery into the North American 
market it is important that members at the top of the chain receive information 
about changes in demand requirements and specifications as soon as possible.  
 
They developed a successful cold chain through a series of mutually beneficial 
relationships with the chain members. In this way they were able to leverage the 
tacit knowledge of experienced chain members as a resource for the firm. They 
rented cooling, fabrication and processing space, utilized labor from a local cool 
storage facility, and accessed knowledge and services from a local meat processor, P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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all in the San Francisco area. A solid relationship with the fabrication facility and 
their butchers was important so that product could be customized on a daily basis to 
customer needs. This increased the value of the product and services provided to 
meat managers who soon recognized very little additional in-store skilled labor was 
necessary.  
 
Similarly, in New Zealand, all the animals were processed into primary cuts, 
packaged in Captec®, a specialized vacuum-sealed seven-layer foil bag filled with 
nitrogen, and chilled through a local meat processor. The Captec® technology 
allowed for the lamb to age without quality deterioration due to oxidation. Meat 
quality actually improved during the journey across the Pacific, becoming tenderer 
and decreasing adverse aromas. 
 
The prevailing market dynamics in the Bay Area often resulted in quick and 
unexpected changes in product requirements so it was necessary that producers 
were willing to be flexible. As a result, members were required to make moderate 
changes to their production processes and practices. Lambs could no longer be sold 
when it suited farmers; instead they were sold to the cooperative when it best suited 
the market. The increased managerial complexity was more than made up by the 
returns generated from the overall operation.  
 
The cooperative was able to gain tacit knowledge through its burgeoning network of 
relationships and its on-site learning in the marketplace. By working directly with 
the consultant over time, immersion in the marketplace, interacting directly with 
customers and intermediaries, the company was able to import new and critical 
tacit knowledge resources. This knowledge not only was strategic for developing the 
distribution and service aspects of the business the knowledge was able to flow back 
to producers and packers affecting their offer. If the cooperative had chosen to 
operate solely from New Zealand it would have attempted to execute a vertical 
strategy without the most important strategic resource, the tacit knowledge of the 




As described above, agricultural structural change is a powerful force and producer 
adaptations are necessary to remain competitive. There are numerous strategies 
available to producer organizations as they attempt to find their place in the supply 
chain. Strategic management theory suggests that long jump or radical strategic 
shifts are unlikely to be successful. The logic is that sustained competitive 
advantage is derived from a firm’s ability to produce value. In order to produce this 
value the firm requires access to knowledge. The type of knowledge that generates 
innovation rents is knowledge that is inimitable, tacit knowledge. How then does 
the firm looking to vertically integrate obtain the necessary tacit knowledge? 
Because this strategic resource is not explicit, it is difficult to acquire.  P. Goldsmith and H. Gow / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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Firms first must understand their own core competencies, uniqueness in the 
marketplace, as well as their inadequacies. Emerging from this assessment the firm 
then needs to access the necessary complementary resources.  Through relationship 
management, supply firms can assess knowledge and participate in value creation 
without the knowledge and managerial burden of vertical integration. Atkins 
Ranch, Inc. serves as an example of producers forgoing brick and mortar investment 
even though doing so would have given them direct control over their product. 
Instead they invested their limited funds in soft knowledge assets such as market 
reconnaissance and marketing expertise. They also leveraged significant amounts of 
tacit resources through their customer and vendor relationships. These investments 
and relationships served them well by not only generating value at the initial stages 
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